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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last twenty-five years the Brazilian capital market1
has exhibited dynamic growth and development. In part, this
growth is due to the industrialization of the economy and the need
for increased capital funds. Increased income, higher savings, and
more effective mobilization of domestic funds have also played a
major role in this development. The efforts on the part of the gov-
ernment to promote the development of the capital market have
been equally important.
Three distinct trends have occurred in Brazil which represent
qualitative aspects of the capital market development and im-
provement. These trends include: 1) the formation of an appropri-
ate legal structure, 2) the development of financial intermediaries
that operate primarily in the capital market, and, more recently, 3)
the emergence of a venture capital industry.
In order to analyze these trends, Part II will focus on the gen-
eral financial system reform that has taken place over the past
three years. Part III will describe briefly the normalization of the
capital market through the legislation enacted in 1964 to 1965 and
again in 1976. This legislation establishes a basic legal structure
that protects investors, mandates adequate levels of corporate dis-
closure, and establishes rules of conduct in the open market. Part
IV will then address the introduction and evolution of various fi-
nancial intermediaries that operate in the capital market, includ-
ing the pension funds and mutual funds. Parts V and VI will ana-
lyze the debt conversion and privatization programs introduced
formally in 1988, since one may consider these programs necessary
ingredients in the development of a venture capital industry in
Brazil. Part VII will describe the emergence of a venture capital
industry. More important, this section will examine the appearance
of special risk-taking funds that carry out venture capital
activities.
1. Generally, capital markets are markets for long-term investment funds.
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II. FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM
If one were to attempt to characterize the Brazilian financial
market sector in the late 1980s, the best possible term might be
"change." Policymakers in many departments of the Brazilian gov-
ernment appear to be uniform in their resolve to plan and initiate
reform of the financial system. This article will focus primarily on
two categories of reform, namely, external debt conversions and
privatization' and will discuss the emergence of a venture capital
industry in Brazil.
In 1987 to 1988, there were strong incentives for reforms in
external debt conversions and privatization because of the internal
economic environment, external debt crisis, and basic economic ne-
cessity. 3 During this period, failure of the Cruzado Plan4 and the
accompanying escalation of inflationary pressures interrupted the
strategy of the government to achieve budgetary balance. Although
inflation was held to twenty-two percent in 1986, it accelerated to
365 percent in 1987 and to 904 percent in 1988.1 The government
no longer could finance industrial investment due to its budgetary
position and the closing down of external sources of capital. More-
over, the general economic environment in Brazil had become less
certain, reinforcing a weakness in investment expenditures of do-
mestic and foreign enterprises. In February 1987, the government
imposed a moratorium on payment of interest on debt held by in-
ternational banks, which extended until June 1988 when a new
debt rescheduling agreement was reached with the coordinating
committee of bank creditors to deal with the external problem.'
Nevertheless, the conclusion of this debt agreement would not sat-
isfy the basic economic need of the Brazilian economy, namely,
channelling liquid funds into active investment programs to acti-
vate the economy more.
Despite these measures, between 1987 and 1988 Brazil moved
into a recessionary phase of its business cycle. In the first quarter
of 1988, industrial production was nine percent lower than a year
2. Other areas of proposed reform include the proposal for all service banks (bancos
multiplos), budget reforms in the federal government, and a change in the conduct of open
market operations in government securities which are carried out by the Central Bank.
3. INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT RE-
PORT 1988, at 34-35 (1988).
4. See 0 Novo Cruzado, 41 CONJUNTURA ECONoMIcA 25 (1987).
5. CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL, 19 BRAZIL ECONOMIC PROGRAM 25 (1988).
6. Debt Rescheduling Accord Ready, Gazeta Mercantil, June 27, 1983, at 3.
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earlier,' and there were indications that only moderate improve-
ment in this sector for the balance of the year was likely. In July
1988, the National Bank for Economic and Social Development
("BNDES") reported that Brazil's trade balance in capital goods
had deteriorated during the 1980s, reflecting a loss of competitive-
ness compared with other countries.8 The BNDES report sug-
gested that Brazil needed to better integrate advances in technol-
ogy into its production processes." The report concluded that
Brazil needed to develop an industrial strategy oriented toward
global cooperation between Brazilian and foreign research and de-
velopment enterprises.1"
To summarize the situation, in 1988 it had become clear that
the Brazilian economy needed to find a way to restore high levels
of investment expenditure. Unfortunately, there were few alterna-
tives, given the budgetary position of the government, the general
economic environment, and the external debt situation. As a result,
Brazil used two programs as partial solutions to these problems.
One program, the debt conversion program, aimed to gradually re-
duce the external debt, but more important, a liquidation of these
claims so that new investment could be carried out.11 The other
program, a privatization program, aimed to improve the efficiency
of the industrial sector, by transferring portions of the industrial
sector controlled by the government to private control and opera-
tion.12 As the discussion in Part III will indicate, both of these pro-
grams provide significant opportunities for development and inno-
vation in the capital market. In addition, they offer a wider and
more diversified base of capital market transactions needed to feed
an emerging venture capital sector.
7. Industrial Production Statistics, 42 CONJUNTURA ECONOMICA 58 (1988).
8. Costa da Sucursal, BNDES Quer Conter a Defasagem Tecnologia, Correio
Brasiliense, July 11, 1988, at 5.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Monteiro, Conversao de Creditos em Investimentos-O Caso Brasileiro, 42 CON-
JUNTURA ECONOMICA 91-93 (1988).
12. Moreira, 0 Grande Desafio, in PRIVATIZACAO, MERCADO DE CAPITALS E DEMOCRACIA
323 (1988).
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III. CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT
A. Current Situation
Brazil has developed a complex and sophisticated capital mar-
ket sector. There are nine stock exchanges, the two largest in Rio
de Janeiro and SAo Paulo. 3 In 1987, these two exchanges ac-
counted for ninety-seven percent of the value of all transactions on
the nine exchanges." In that year the aggregate value of all trans-
actions on the nine exchanges was US$7.3 billion,'5 with approxi-
mately 650 companies having their shares registered for trading.16
The development of the stock exchanges has been furthered
substantially by government policy. The stock exchanges offer Bra-
zilian companies the opportunity to obtain new capital by offering
shares in the primary market. In 1986, a record US$1.2 billion of
such financing took place.'7 Similarly, new debenture issues could
be placed in the primary market, although the volume of new fi-
nancing using this means is considerably smaller than in the case
of new share issues.' 8
Financial institutions have played a critical role in the devel-
opment of a capital market. These institutions add to the liquidity
of the capital market and channel new funds into it. A variety of
capital market institutions now operate, investing in shares, deben-
tures, federal government securities, state and local government se-
curities, mortgage instruments, and other financial assets.' 9 At the
end of 1986, six major types of institutions had combined asset
portfolios of Cz$155.9 billion.2 Since 1986 there has been strong
growth in mutual funds created to invest primarily in short-term
instruments.2"
In 1988, sixty-four of these funds were operating with re-
13. COMiSSX.O NACIONAL DE BOLSAS DE VALORES, RELATORIO 1987, at 31 (1988).
14. Id.
15. This figure is arrived at by using the average cruzado-dollar exchange rate in 1987.
Basically there are four types of trading on the nine stock exchanges: sight, term, options,
and exercise of options.
16. CoMiss o NACIONAL DE BOLSAS DE VALORES, RELATORIO 1985, at 25 (1986).
17. Rio DE JANEIRO STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK 1988, at 35 (1988).
18. See Moreira, supra note 12, at 323.
19. BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, RELATORIO 1986, at 47-54 (1987).
20. Id. at 54.
21. Jornal de Brasilia, July 9, 1988, at 6; Galazi, As Muitas Opq5es de Lucros, 1988
BOLSA 9.
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sources of Cz$977 billion (US$6.1 billion).2 2 The total capital of
share, fixed income, and short-term funds at February 1988 was
US$8.2 billion.23 Given the substantial increase in value of shares
on the Brazilian stock markets in the first half of 1988, these
figures understate the role of the share funds in the capital
market.2
4
B. Development of the Legal Structure
Over the past twenty-five years in conjunction with its capital
market sector, Brazil has developed a sophisticated and complex
legal structure, aimed at promoting the growth of its financial mar-
kets. Since the mid-1960s, Brazil has made a great deal of progress
in the development of its capital market. In part, this progress has
been accomplished by building a sound legal base. Until the mid-
1960s, Brazil lacked modern securities markets and well developed
financial intermediaries. The first important government measures,
addressing these problems, came during 1964 to 1965. At this time,
two important laws were enacted, namely Law No. 4595,25 which
created the National Monetary Council ("CMN") and provided a
stable framework for the operation of banking and financial mar-
ket institutions, and Law No. 4728,26 also known as the Capital
Market Law, which provided for the creation and the regulation of
new institutions and financial market incentives.
As provided for in Law No. 4595, the CMN sits at the top of
the financial structure coordinating the activities of the Central
Bank and National Securities Commission. The Central Bank, in
turn, implements decisions of the CMN and supervises financial
institutions. 21 Until 1976, when the National Securities Commis-
sion was created, the Central Bank was responsible for administer-
ing the provisions of Law No. 4728.2"
Law No. 4728 was the first comprehensive set of rules for the
development of the capital market in Brazil. It empowered the
22. Jornal de Brasilia, supra note 21.
23. See infra app., table 2.
24. Aqces Ganho Real de 110% no Semestre, 0 Globo, July 11, 1988, at 16.
25. Law No. 4595 of December 31, 1964, reprinted in CoMIssAO NACIONAL DE BOLSAS DE
VALORES, LEGISLAI AO SOBRE MERCADO DE CAPITALS 1-28 (1986) [hereinafter LEGISLArAO].
26. Law No. 4728 of July 14, 1965, reprinted in LEGISLA4;AO, supra note 25, at 29-62.
27. See supra note 25.
28. Law No. 6385 of December 7, 1976, reprinted in LEGISLAI AO, supra note 25, at 80-
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Central Bank to establish and supervise the stock exchanges, regis-
ter new issues of securities, and supervise financial disclosures by
companies.29 This law provided that the CMN could establish min-
imum capital requirements for brokerage companies and rules for
operation of the stock exchanges, including brokerage commissions
and margin requirements."
Law No. 4728 also established guidelines for access to the fi-
nancial markets and required that registration with the Central
Bank precede an issue of new securities." Further, this legislation
provided more flexible use of bond and debenture issues, including
use of monetary correction to keep up with inflation.2 This law
sought to establish an institutional market for securities and gave
the Central Bank authority to approve the creation of investment
funds.3 3 Tax incentives were provided for investors holding shares
in open capital companies.3 4
The Capital Market Law provided an important stimulus to
the development of the Brazilian financial markets. It organized
and consolidated the law governing the capital market into a more
orderly system. Equally important, it brought new institutions into
the capital market. Prominent among these institutions were the
investment banks which were authorized to carry on direct lend-
ing, purchase of shares, and issue of guarantees. Probably the most
important contribution of Law No. 4728 was its requirement of in-
formation disclosure by companies whose securities are traded on
the stock exchanges.3 "
Firms were required to submit financial statements and secur-
ities to the Central Bank, which could refuse registration if it de-
cided the financial data was incomplete or inadequate. In short,
through the passage of this law the government established and
defined the basic institutional structure for financial development.
29. See supra note 26.
30. See id. arts. 7-10.
31. Id. arts. 17-21.
32. Law No. 4728 permitted issue of debentures with monetary correction. See id. arts.
26 & 27. An issue of this kind would protect the investor from the erosion of value due to
inflation, and make securities more attractive to investors. Since 1965, virtually all deben-
tures issued in Brazil have become protected by monetary correction.
33. Id. arts. 49 & 50.
34. Open capital companies are companies which register their shares with the stock
exchange and make their shares available to public ownership and trading.
35. See supra note 26, arts. 20 & 21.
36. Id. arts. 16 & 17.
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In 1967, the government adopted a fiscal incentive measure to
promote financial institution development, namely, Decree Law
No. 157.2 The approach taken in this legislation could be termed a
"forced savings" approach, designed to channel funds into the
stock market. This law required taxpayers to use part of their in-
come tax liabilities to purchase shares of Fiscal Funds. In effect,
the use of these funds was a new approach that went beyond mar-
ginal incentives to encourage wider ownership and more active
trading of shares.38 Investment banks, finance companies, and bro-
kerage firms managed the Fiscal Fund portfolios, creating a large
pool of savings. A strong stock market boom followed, which ended
in 1971 with major reversal and decline.
C. The Second Round of Legal Reforms
In 1976, Brazil implemented a second round of legal measures,
because by the mid-1970s it became clear that if the capital mar-
kets were to grow at a pace consistent with the needs of the econ-
omy, several problems required immediate attention. The need to
restore investor confidence and credibility in the stock market sys-
tem, the absence of a government agency given the specific task of
supervising the securities markets, the need for more detailed dis-
closure and financial reporting by companies, and limited develop-
ment of institutional investors in the capital market, were four of
these pressing problems. In response to these problems, two laws
were passed in 1976, Law No. 6385, which created the National
Securities Commission ("CVM"), and Law No. 6404," 9 which es-
tablished an improved system of corporate disclosure and share-
holder protection.
Law No. 6385 is a cornerstone of the capital market. It created
a system of surveillance over capital market activities and institu-
tions. Major provisions of this law include:
1) creating the CVM, its areas of jurisdiction, and the scope of
37. Legislative Decree No. 157 of February 10, 1967; see also L. TRUBEK, LAW, PLANNING
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN CAPITAL MARKET 56-58 (N.Y.U. Inst. Fin. Bull.
Nos. 72 & 73, April 1971).
38. R. Teixeira da Costa, The Brazilian Experience in the Development of a Capital
Market 12 (May 1987) (paper presented at International Investment Conference, Istanbul,
Turkey).
39. Law No. 6404 of December 7, 1976, reprinted in LEGISLA(AO, supra note 25, at 94-
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its broad powers;'
2) extending authority to the CVM to register securities prior
to their distribution and trading;4'1
3) granting the CVM authority to issue regulations concerning
publicly held companies and the disclosure of transactions in com-
pany shares;
42
4) extending jurisdiction to the CVM over the administration
of portfolios and custody of securities; 3 and
5) granting the CVM authority to register chartered account-
ing firms and independent accountants."
The second important piece of legislation was Law No. 6404
also known as the Corporation Law. 4' This law protects the stock
market through its institutional framework." Also, it provides the
corporate manager with the legal and financial requirements for
modernization of Brazilian companies."7 Most important, Law No.
6404 set up a regulatory system designed to give investors confi-
dence in the capital market.48 Among other subjects, this law gives
close attention to the following areas: corporate disclosure and
presentation of financial statements, shareholder protection, issu-
ance of shares and debentures, and corporate governance.' 9
IV. EXPANDED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Beginning in 1977, several laws and resolutions were promul-
gated which were aimed at encouraging the development of finan-
cial institutions in the capital market. In 1977, Law No. 6435 was
enacted, which provided detailed rules for the creation and opera-
tion of private pension funds." Since 1977, these institutions have
40. Supra note 28, arts. 3-14.
41. Id. arts. 15-17, 19-20.
42. Id. arts. 21 & 22.
43. Id. art. 23.
44. Id. art. 26.
45. See supra note 39.
46. Id. chs. 1 & 2.
47. Id. ch. 1, arts. 1-3.
48. Id. chs. 4 (beneficial interests of stockholders), 7 (organization and administration
of companies and issue of shares) & 9 (regulation of changes in capital of a publicly owned
company).
49. Id. chs. 3-5 (issue of shares and debentures) & 9 (disclosure and presentation of
financial statements). See also id. chs. 9, 10, 14, 16 (shareholder protection), 11, 20 & 21
(corporate governance).
50. Law No. 6435 ushered in a new era in Brazilian capital market development. In the
19891
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
experienced rapid growth, such that by 1980, their resources were
twice as large as resources of insurance companies.51 Basically,
there are two types of pension funds: closed funds, which are man-
aged by sponsoring firms and provide benefits to covered employ-
ees; and open funds, which are managed by banks, securities com-
panies, and special investment management firms. The resources
of closed pension funds are considerably greater than resources of
open funds.52 Still, pension funds have become the largest institu-
tional investor group in the capital market. 3 However, mutual
funds have also displayed high growth, especially since passage of
Resolution 119954 which authorizes the creation of mutual funds
for investment in short-term assets.55
Central Bank Resolution 1184 allows the creation of venture
capital companies. Generally, venture capital firms invest their re-
sources in smaller Brazilian companies, whose securities are not
listed for trading on stock exchanges. This resolution bestows fi-
nancial incentives on companies that receive investments from
venture capital companies.5 6 Among the incentives is the right to
exclude from taxable income the dividends and profits paid to ven-
ture capital investors. 7
One can find authority to create Patrimonio Individual to
Trabalhador ("PAIT") Funds in Decree Law No. 2292. 58 PAIT
Funds serve as a tax deductible savings plan for workers, and can
be established by individuals as well as companies. The tax incen-
tive for these plans remains available provided that invested funds
ten year period between 1977 and 1987 pension funds grew to become the largest single
capital investor. See infra app., table 1.
51. See Banco Central do Brasil, Res. 1184, 124 D.O. 13399 (Sept. 5, 1986).
52. See infra app., table 1.
53. COMISSAO DE VALORES MOBILIARIOS, RELATORIO 1986, at 32-37 (1987).
54. Resolution 1199 of October 10, 1986. See also BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, RE-
LATORIO 1986, at 120 (1987).
55. See Resolution 1199 of October 10, 1986. For data indicating the size of these funds,
see infra app., table 2.
56. The financial incentives available to venture capital companies under Brazilian reg-
ulations include: 1) tax deductibility of dividends received by the venture capital company
for the dividend paying company; 2) tax exemption for the venture capital company of divi-
dends received and capital gains originated from investment or liquidation of participation;
and 3) taxation of stockholders of venture capital companies at a rate of 23% on proceeds
received and capital gains originated in the sale of the participating company.
57. R. Teixeira da Costa, The Venture Capital Industry in Brazil (June 1988) (paper
presented at the Investing in Brazil Conference, SAo Paulo, Brazil).
58. See Law No. 2292 of November 21, 1986 and implementation measures contained in
Decree 93,989 of Jan. 30, 1987.
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are not withdrawn before ten years.5 9 These funds are adminis-
tered by investment banks and securities firms. Their investments
are regulated in a manner similar to that applicable to share mu-
tual funds.
Foreign capital investment funds are regulated by Resolution
128960 and are subject to supervision of the Central Bank and the
National Securities Commission. 1 Although under Resolution 1289
three different types of legal entities can be established, their oper-
ational purpose, to obtain capital from foreign investors and invest
the majority of funds (minimum seventy percent) in listed shares, 2
is similar.63 As of mid-1988 these funds had not attracted substan-
tial foreign investment funds."'
V. DEBT CONVERSION PROGRAM
A. The Debt Problem-Major Issues
Since the onset of the external debt crisis in 1982, many solu-
tions have been offered, yet few have been implemented. During
1982 to 1986, an optimistic interpretation persisted concerning
Brazil's large external debt, namely, that Brazil faced a liquidity
crisis more than a problem of basic insolvency.6 5 This attitude
changed in 1986 to 1987 as the Cruzado Plan proved a failure, and
as inflation persisted and even escalated. The February 1987 mora-
torium declared by Brazil on external debt service ushered in a
new pessimism, amplified by debt write-offs by large creditor
banks. 6
In this same period, international banks traded Brazilian debt
paper in a secondary market at discounts of twenty to thirty per-
59. Id.
60. Resolution 1289 of March 20, 1987. See generally BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, RE-
LATORIO 1987 (1988).
61. Resolution 1289 of March 20, 1987.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., FIRST BOSTON CORP. & MERRILL LYNCH CAPITAL MARKETS CORP., THE BRA-
ZIL FUND PROSPECTUS 34 (March 31, 1988) [hereinafter BRAZIL FUND].
65. This view prevailed despite the need for Brazil to rigidly force its balance of trade
into surpluses. These surpluses exceeded US$12 billion a year to generate the amount of
foreign exchange needed for interest payments on nearly US$70 billion of external debt
owed to banks and US$40 billion of official debt owed to governments and international
organizations. See Burnhill, Commercial Banks and the Moratorium, 8 INFOBRAZIL 10
(1987).
66. Id.
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cent of the face value.17 In 1987, this market suffered a sharp de-
cline because of creditor banks announcements of a moratorium
and write-off of Brazilian loan paper. 8 By the middle of 1988, Bra-
zilian debt paper had recovered to a little over fifty percent of its
original face value," reflecting the conclusion of a negotiated debt
rescheduling with the creditor banks, and the resumption of pay-
ments of interest on external debt owed to international banks.7
In response to the debt problem, debt conversion has been re-
garded as a partial but necessary solution. 1 Until the formal debt
conversion problem began in 1988, only limited amounts of Brazil-
ian debt had been converted. 2
Generally, external debt can be converted into risk capital (eq-
uity shares) or other debt. In this conversion process, the interests
of the debtor country, bank creditor, and investor must be bal-
anced. Some of the reasons for Brazil's delay in implementing an
active program until 1988 can be attributed to the following char-
acteristics of the Brazilian economy:
1) Control of Brazilian Enterprises. Until 1987 considerable
opposition to an active conversion program existed in Brazil be-
cause of the fear of excessive foreign control of Brazilian industry.
In deciding which form of debt conversion would best avoid this
problem, suggestions ranged from special mutual funds (holding
only minority interests) to prohibition of foreign investor
conversion.
2) Capital Market Capacity. This issue involved how much
debt could be converted during any one time period. Over 1985 to
1988, the aggregate value of stock exchange listed shares ranged
67. A. Parhizgari, Latin American Debt-Equity Swaps 6-10 (Dec. 29, 1987) (paper
presented at the North American Economic and Finance Association Conference, Chicago,
Illinois).
68. Indeed, at one point in 1987 the discount was as large as 60%. Corretoras Ameri-
canas Procuram Alternativas para Regras Brazileiras, Gazeta Mercantil, July 1, 1988, at
21.
69. On July 1, 1988, Brazilian debt paper was being quoted Bid 52-Ask 53 as a percent
of face value. This quote is within the range of values for the previous 18 months of Bid 40-
Ask 75, but below the price range for 1986. Id.
70. Debt Rescheduling Accord Ready, Gazeta Mercantil, June 27, 1988, at 3.
71. See Bresser Pereira, Mudancas no Padra o de Investimento, 8 REVISTA DE
ECONOMIA POLITICA 20 (1987) (the author, a former finance minister, describes the key role
played by external debt in limiting Brazil's economic growth prospects).
72. Winandy, Conversao Formal Deve Atingir US$1.02 Bilhho No Semestre, Gazeta
Mercantil, June 16, 1988, at 23.
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between seventeen billion dollars to forty-two billion dollars. 3
Conversion of one-fourth of the bank held debt could effectively
denationalize the industrial sector and still leave a substantial ex-
ternal debt.
3) Discount on Existing Debt. Large discounts on debt conver-
sion enabled purchasers of the debt to gain control of Brazilian
productive assets at low prices. In effect, foreign investors could
have enjoyed advantages over domestic investors seeking to invest
in Brazilian industry. Moreover, the government could not give
formal recognition to the discounted value of external debt.
While these preceding issues delayed the implementation of a
formal program, economic necessity placed increasing pressure on
the government to take action. The slow economic growth in the
1980s was attributed to low investment. Low investment activity,
in turn, was partially associated with a lack of financial resources
and with government delay in taking a more positive approach to-
ward the debt problem and the economic imbalance.
B. Conversions Before and After 1988
The legal foundation of the conversion of external debt into
risk capital extends as far back as 1965.1' Formal conversions regis-
tered with the Central Bank were small in dollar amount until
1982, when a large secondary market developed. Formal conver-
sions increased to $452 million in 1983, and to $700 million in
1984. 75 In 1987 to 1988 formal conversions climbed to $745 million
and $2.5 billion, respectively. 6 Informal conversions which are not
registered with the Central Bank are difficult to estimate, but they
probably reached $800 million in the twelve months before June
1988./
Decree No. 55,762 of February 17, 1965 had been the legal
foundation for debt conversions until 1988. In 1978 and 1979, the
government allowed incentives for converting debt into preferred
shares of enterprises through the deductibility of dividends paid to
73. Rio DE JANEIRO STOCK EXCHANGE, BRAZILIAN MARKET NEws, May 1989, at 3.
74. See Decree No. 55,762, art. 50 (1965). On the basis of this decree, formal and infor-
mal conversions of debt into equity took place throughout the 1980s.
75. See Winandy, supra note 72.
76. Id.
77. Id.
1989] 549
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
these shares.7 8 These incentives came about as a result of Decree
Law No. 4598 of 1977 and Decree Law No. 5654 of 1978. 79
In 1983 and 1984, the government enacted new incentives for
debt conversion. Decree Law No. 1994 of December 29, 1982 pro-
vided a financial credit of up to ten percent for contracts for the
conversion of debt entered into before December 31, 1982. Central
Bank Circular Letter 1125, from November 9, 1984 to July 28,
1987, stated that only the original creditor could be a candidate for
investment through conversions, and only that original creditor's
investment would be registered with the Central Bank at face
value. This refusal to allow third parties to register investments at
the Central Bank at face value was based on the concern expressed
in some circles that the investor was gaining from a system, where
little or no advantages accrued to the debtor country."
New regulations required that in 1987 requests for conversion
presented before July 20, 1987 had to be processed in accordance
with the rules of Circular 1125 of 1984.81' Requests received after
July 20, 1987 would be processed under new rules to be issued in
1988.82
C. Resolution 1460
Until 1987, Brazil delayed installing a conversion program.
There were practical reasons for this delay, such as potentially
higher costs of servicing foreign equity investment as compared to
foreign debt, political concerns of takeovers by foreign companies,
and the possibility of narrowing the base of creditor banks.
Finally, in January 1988, the National Monetary Council es-
tablished guidelines for a formal conversion program when it ap-
proved Resolution 1460.83 Major guidelines of the Resolution are:
1) funds invested may be repatriated only after a twelve year
period;84
78. Monteiro, A Conversao de Divida Externa Como Instrumento de Capitalizacao de
Empresas, 42 CONJUNTURA ECONOMICA 60-61 (1988).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Banco de Boston, Debt Equity Conversions, in NEWSLETTER BRAZIL, May 30,
1988, at 2-3.
82. Id.
83. Brazilian Swap Frontier, Gazeta Mercantil, April 25, 1988, at 1-4.
84. Id.
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2) dividends from a conversion (swap) investment may be re-
mitted freely but are subject to the usual withholding tax;85
3) conversions are not permitted where the investor has a
guarantee of fixed remuneration on the proposed investment be-
cause a fixed return is in discordance with the concept of risk
investment; 6
4) swaps will not be permitted where they transfer control of a
company from Brazilian residents to residents abroad; however,
this prohibition does not prevent foreign investors from increasing
capital invested in existing foreign controlled enterprises or creat-
ing new foreign controlled enterprises; 7 and
5) profits from swap investments cannot be withdrawn for
twelve years unless for reinvestment in Brazil. 88
There are two distinct formats for conversion, namely, exter-
nal debt already due for repayment, and external debt coming due
in the future. In the case of external debt already due for repay-
ment in 1988, twenty-five billion dollars was due and owing to
creditors. Circular Letter 1302 deals directly with this portion of
the debt. With respect to debt due for repayment, swaps can be
carried out by monthly auction.89 The first auction was held on
March 29, 1988 at the Rio Stock Exchange with a ceiling of US
$150 million to be converted. Half of the equity auctioned
monthly must be swapped into the high priority areas of the
Northern and Northeastern regions.9 1 The other half is used to
build up swap mutual funds and for swaps in non-priority areas.92
The first four auctions have alternated between the Rio de Janeiro
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Monthly auctions involve bidders swapping debt into local funds for equity invest-
ments. The equity investments can be in a high priority area of the Northern and North-
eastern regions, or in non-priority areas and to build up swap mutual funds (through which
debt is converted into shares purchased on the stock exchange).
90. The US$150 million ceiling was established to limit the monetary expansion (usu-
ally inflationary) effects of the debt conversions. Nevertheless, in January, 1988, the
monthly swap auctions were suspended temporarily due to inflation pressures. Temporary
Suspension of Auctions Does Not Stop Swaps, RIo DE JANEIRO STOCK EXCHANGE, BRAZILIAN
MARKET NEWS, March 1989, at 1.
91. See Banco de Boston, supra note 81, at 4.
92. These funds can be invested in any of the more prosperous southern provinces of
Brazil, including Rio Grande do Sul, ParanA, SAo Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Southeast. See
Monteiro, supra note 78.
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and Silo Paulo Stock Exchanges.9 3
Under the second format for conversion, Circular Letter 1303
deals with the portion of external debt coming due in the future. 4
Of this external debt, US$32.4 billion is public sector debt and
US$10 billion is private sector debt.95 This debt may be swapped
through direct negotiation between the foreign creditor and bor-
rower at a discount that need not be revealed to the Central
Bank. The investment is registered with the Central Bank at an
amount determined by using the average rate of discount estab-
lished at the most recent swap auction." By April 1988, the Cen-
tral Bank had received close to US$2 billion in proposals for di-
rectly negotiated swaps.9 8
In 1988, the basic guidelines for swap mutual funds were de-
fined. 9 Swap funds can raise capital from foreign creditors and
fund managers that convert loans into the fund. There are certain
"degree of control" restrictions on the amount a fund may invest
in a single Brazilian company."'0 As of mid-1988, eight of the fifty-
four swap funds that had been proposed and approved were
operating.101
93. At the first three swap auctions in 1988, the discounts bid on debt paper swapped
were for free investment, 27% (March), 32% (April), and 22% (May); and for investment in
needy areas, 10.5% (March), 15.0% (April), and 0.5% (May). See Winandy, supra note 72.
94. Circular Letter 1303, March 18, 1988. See Banco de Boston, supra note 81, at 2-3.
95. By June, 1988, the Central Bank estimated that it received US$2 Billion in propos-
als for swaps through direct negotiation. See Banco de Boston, supra note 81, at 2.
96. The cruzados simply change hands within the financial system and the investment
is registered with the Departamento de Fiscaliza4Ao e Registro de Capitais Estrangeros
("FIRCE"), the Central Bank department that registers foreign capital in Brazil.
97. Although the discount used in the transaction is undisclosed, the amount swapped
is registered with the Central Bank at the average rate at the most recent swap auction. See
Banco de Boston, supra note 81, at 3.
98. The Central Bank has no set limit to the amount of maturing debt that may be
converted, except in the three cases: loans taken out by Brazilian banks for lending again to
local companies under Resolution 63, loans taken out by borrowers looking for funding to
repay maturing debts, and loans taken out by leasing companies under the terms of Circular
Letter 600.
99. At least 70% of each fund's portfolio must be invested in private sector companies
whose shares are publicly traded or in other firms that meet CVM requirements for similar
characteristics. The remaining 30% can be invested in government securities or in open
market operations. See Monteiro, supra note 78.
100. The portfolios of swap funds will be restricted to 5% of the voting capital or 20%
of total equity in a company. Id.
101. Magalh~es, So Oito Fundos de Conversao Operam, Gazeta Mercantil, July 23,
1988, at 1.
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D. Informal Conversions
Informal swap activity has been an important aspect of debt
conversions for many years. Informal swaps offer certain advan-
tages. For example, domestic investors might not need to register
their investment with the Central Bank for remittance purposes,"'2
since those seeking short-term gains would have little interest in
registration." 3
Until 1988, participants could generate very short-term arbi-
trage profits due to the different percentage discounts or premiums
on external debt in the secondary market, and on the dollar in the
parallel (unofficial) foreign exchange market. This practice became
common and is referred to as a "bicycle operation."' 0' The basic
problem with this operation is that it provided no lasting benefits
for the debtor country. An agent-investor functioned as an inter-
mediary, reaping profits from purchasing dollar debt at a discount,
converting the debt paper into cruzados by surrender of it to the
Brazilian debtor, and purchasing parallel dollars with the cruzados.
An agent-investor would then continuously repeat this process.
On June 28, 1988, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 1326
to ensure that such conversions would be channeled into domestic
investment."0 5 The controls required that cruzados received from
the informal conversions be paid into bank accounts, and that the
bank notify the Central Bank of the deposit, original creditor, na-
ture of payment, value of funds transfer in the foreign currency
and local currency, discount, and money recipient.'06
102. Domestic investors could also benefit from any discounts on conversion funds
available locally. Winandy, Boa Vista Fica Corn o Major Lote, Gazeta Mercantil, July 29,
1988, at 23.
103. Brokerage houses and banks can function as asset traders who specialize in negoti-
ating assets on the international foreign debt secondary market. These banks form a link
between creditors wanting to clean up their assets and companies wishing to buy loans at a
discount and make a profit on the spread between the discount on the secondary loan mar-
ket and that set at swap auctions. Horita, Lloyds Investe no Banco US$55 Milhbes de
Divida, Jornal do Brasil, June 28, 1988, at 11.
104. These "bicycle" transactions provided no basic economic benefits for the debtor
country. In effect, the arbitrageur-intermediary generated profits based on varying discounts
along the successive steps in the conversion process. Conversao Informal da Divida Agora
Tern Norma, 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, July 1, 1988, at 26 [hereinafter Convers5o].
105. In this case the Central Bank indicated it did not wish to interfere with the free
application of cruzado proceeds from debt conversions, but to make certain that these
cruzados would be utilized in Brazil. BC Regulamenta Operabes Informais, Gazeta Mer-
cantil, July 1, 1988, at 21.
106. BC Baixa Normas de Controla Para a Conversao Informal, Jornal do Brasil, July
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VI. PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
Privatization in Brazil has its own, uniquely national charac-
ter. It has emerged in response to economic need and general rec-
ognition that the private sector can operate more efficiently than
the public sector in producing and delivering goods and services.1°7
Defined broadly, the privatization program operated in Brazil on a
limited scale for many years; defined narrowly, it began in 1988.
A. Early Divestments
Early divestments were carried out under the supervision of
the CVM.'0 8 These divestments involved the sale of companies
from the portfolios of regional development funds such as Fundo
de Investimentos da Amazonia ("FINAM").' °9 Approximately
3,000 companies were acquired by these regional funds as a result
of fiscal incentives provided under various public sector financing
programs.'10 For nearly ten years the CVM has arranged to dispose
of these interests by auctions on the Brazilian stock exchanges. In
such cases, CVM or the government has exercised no management
role."' The companies involved are private sector oriented, and
these auctions represent simple divestment by the government.
These auctions are similar to a private placement, a divestment
characterized by a limited number of bidders. Many of these com-
panies are not registered with the CVM or stock exchanges because
they are closed capital companies. No further trading of these
shares is possible on the stock exchanges, unless the company has
its capital opened through full disclosure and registration."' In-
1, 1988, at 14.
107. Trevisan, Estatais, Privatizar Para Ndo Sucatear, 5 REVISTA DA CVM 8 (1987).
Trevisan provides data showing that, over the 1980s, state enterprises in Brazil experienced
declining growth in assets, weak productivity trends, and low profitability. With respect to
self-finance, state enterprises were able to generate one-third of resources required for their
investment programs, with the remainder coming from borrowing and the federal treasury.
108. The National Securities Commission was given responsibility due to its interest in
promoting development of the capital market. R. TEIXEIRA DA COSTA, BRAZIL'S EXPERIENCE
IN CREATING A CAPITAL MARKET 53-55 (1985).
109. The regional development funds had assisted financing industrial development in
their respective regions. In this role they acquired participations in many private sector
enterprises. SUDENE, FISCAL AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENTS IN NORTHEAST BRA-
ZIL 19-21 (1987).
110. Given the private sector nature of these companies, the term divestment is proba-
bly more appropriate than privatization.
111. Interview with Jose Breno Salomio, CVM officer, August 1987.
112. For example, Copene, a petrochemical company was auctioned and then after-
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deed, only shares of open capital companies may be traded on the
stock exchanges.1"'
A second type of auction, similar to the stock exchange auc-
tion, sells ownership of companies acquired by the National Bank
for Economic and Social Development ("BNDES"). In many cases
these companies became financially weak. There were limited al-
ternatives to the BNDES taking control of them, since BNDES
was a major creditor of these enterprises. In a BNDES takeover,
the investment banking affiliate of BNDES ("BNDESPAR") often
played a management role in these enterprises.
BNDES has usually disposed of these holdings in auctions
conducted on the stock exchanges. An auction is one of several al-
ternatives utilized by BNDES. Other alternatives involve closing
down the company where profit prospects are very low; stock mar-
ket sale where profitability is satisfactory; or a change of ownership
(including sale to state governments).
In a typical auction, BNDES holds a majority of the company
stock and auctions it to the highest bidder. The planned auction of
Caraiba Metais is a prime illustration." 4 In July 1988, BNDES an-
nounced its intention to sell sixty-seven percent of the voting stock
of this company.'" Caraiba is the only producer of copper in Bra-
zil, and approximately 140 companies purchase its output."6 The
Caraiba privatization is one of the largest privatizations under-
taken by BNDES." 7
wards went public. After going public, Copene became a very large and successful company.
Rio DE JANEIRO STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK 1989, at 16, 41 (1989).
113. See supra note 26, arts. 3, 53-55. Law No. 4728 established mandatory registration
of securities issued and traded through the securities distribution system, and created tax
incentives for companies to open their capital. See also Conversdo, supra note 104.
114. An initial step in preparing the Caraiba privatization was to split the enterprise
into two parts, a mining company and a copper processing company. The processing unit
was offered for sale in the auction. Lupa, Caraiba da Prejuico de US$1 Bilhao ao BNDES,
Jornal do Brasil, July 4, 1988, at 22.
115. In preparing the auction, BNDESPAR limited foreign ownership to 16% of the
capital with direct vote. To widen ownership of the company (also known as pulverizing
capital), a second distribution of Preference Shares was scheduled. Prior opportunity to
purchase these shares was designated for 116 consumer companies that purchase copper
from Caraiba. Id.
116. Eight large customers purchase over 50% of production. These customers protect
the smaller customers by selling them non-voting stock. This ownership gives the smaller
customers the power to decide how to divide up to 20% of the production of Caraiba. Id.
117. As of January 31, 1988, total assets of Caraiba Metais were valued at US$439.7
million. Id. This information was made available by BNDESPAR in a fact sheet which it
generally provides in the case of privatizations.
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B. Council for Privatization
Pre-1988 sale of share participations by CVM and BNDES
were mainly divestments and not privatizations. These divest-
ments represented share investments acquired either during fi-
nancing of priority sectors, or bailing out companies experiencing
financial difficulty.11 In 1985, a new initiative emerged when Presi-
dent Sarney issued Decree No. 91,991.119 This decree established
an Interministerial Council for Privatization and indicated enter-
prises under government control would be included in a privatiza-
tion program.110 Certain types of companies were specifically not
included in the proposed program in particular where national se-
curity was involved, and where a legal monopoly was required.12'
By 1987, the Interministerial Council established a portfolio of
sixty-five state enterprises to be privatized. The portfolio included
twenty-five percent of state enterprises in the productive sector.122
On March 29, 1988, Decree No. 95,886 was issued.2 3 The 1988
Decree adopted a broader approach to privatization, deregulation,
and "desestatizao. '"124 The name of the Council was changed to
Conselho Federal de Desestatizaio, to reflect this broader ap-
proach. In mid-1988, the Council issued its own plan of action
which called for:
1) a variety of methods to implement its program, including
opening the capital of enterprises, adding to the capital of firms by
sale of share participations, or dissolution of firms;
2) standard procedures such as publishing minimum prices in
118. Regarding companies experiencing financial difficulty, BNDES, a major creditor of
the company would acquire a controlling interest, or even complete ownership. In 1988,
BNDES was approaching a position where it had only 3 or 4 companies in this status re-
maining to be divested. Id.
119. Decree No. 91,991 of Nov. 29, 1985, reprinted in J. CODIMEC, PRIVATIZAIAO, MER-
CADO DE CAPITAIS E DEMOCRACIA 352-56 (1988).
120. The Interministerial Council was assigned broad authority to initiate conditions
and criteria for privatization, subject to general requirements of broad disclosure of activi-
ties, use of market facilities (including stock exchanges), use of external auditors, and a
requirement that control was reserved to Brazilian residents or firms. Id.
121. Id. art. 4.
122. Moreira, supra note 12, at 334.
123. A Integra de Projeta de Desestatizagao Preperado Pelo Governo, Folha de S~o
Paulo, June 10, 1988, at 3.
124. The term "desestatizai;o" refers to a transfer to the private sector of services
which can be provided indirectly; extinction of agencies providing economic services; and
disposition of assets or enterprises that provide services that can be provided alternatively
by the private sector. No term in English adequately conveys the full meaning of this word.
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the sale of enterprises and publicly disclosing privatization activi-
ties; and
3) professionals or specialized firms to be used for consulta-
tion, audits, and distribution of shares." 5 The Council's plans as
well as the debt conversion and privatization programs are ex-
pected to stimulate the venture capital industry in Brazil and pro-
mote further development of the capital market.
VIII. VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL
A. Emergence of Venture Capital Industry
The Brazilian venture capital experience is fairly recent. Given
the economic environment in Brazil, a number of firms in this in-
dustry have patterned their activities along the banque d'affaires
model. Recent legislation gives specific guidelines and tax incen-
tives. As of July 1988, fifteen venture capital companies were oper-
ating in Brazil, 121 with an estimated $150 million of capital
investment.'27
Decree No. 2284 and Resolution 1184 of September 4, 1986
legally established venture capital companies."' These companies
may invest their own resources in the securities of small and me-
dium size Brazilian companies and, at times, bring other investors
into the financing project. Venture capital companies generally fo-
cus their activities on the industrial sector, as they are not permit-
ted to invest in financial institutions and certain other types of
companies. 29
Decree Law 2284 and Resolution 1184 grants important
incentives for venture capital activities, including:
1) tax-deductibility of dividends paid by the investee company
125. Id.
126. Included among these companies are Citicorp Venture Capital, Brasilpar Com6rcio
e Participai3es (operating since 1980), Arbi Participa46es, Companhia Riograndense de Par-
ticipacbes, Credibanco Participa4Ses, Acel Investimento, Partbank, and Brazilian Venture
Capital ("BVC").
127. See infra app., table 3. This figure does not include the capital of BNDESPAR,
which in many respects operates as a venture capital company by taking temporary partici-
pations in growing companies.
128. Resolution 1184 followed Decree Law No. 2284. See supra note 51 and accompany-
ing text.
129. For instance, venture capital companies are not permitted to invest in financial
institutions, and certain other type companies.
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to the venture capital investor are for the dividend paying
company;
2) exempting venture capital companies from paying taxes on
dividends received and capital gains originating from divestment
or liquidation of participations; and
3) taxing at a rate of twenty-three percent, venture capital
company stockholders, the proceeds received and the capital gains
originated by the liquidation or sale of the participation company
are taxable at the rate of twenty-three percent.
Considering the normal income tax rate in Brazil in 1988 was forty
percent, up from twenty-five percent in 1985, these incentives are
formidable indeed.
Although the venture capital industry is a recent phenomenon,
numerous characteristics of Brazil can contribute to its success and
growth. First, there is a strong entrepreneurial culture in Brazil
which is based on a sense of dedication, initiative, hard work, and
willingness to take risks.'30 Second, current securities law provides
an appropriate environment for venture capital. Law No. 6404 of
1976 covers all investment instruments that could be used and are
currently used by venture capital companies in Brazil such as pre-
ferred stock, cumulative and non-cumulative preferred, convertible
preferred, subordinated and convertible debentures. Third, while
ordinarily technological investment involves high research and de-
velopment costs and high risks in terms of applicability, success,
and marketing, in Brazil these risks and costs are lower because
technology projects, already used successfully in mature econo-
mies, can be transferred easily to Brazil. Any remaining risks are
centered on people, timing and finance, which are more managea-
ble and assessable risks than any risks involved in new technology
applications and marketing. Fourth, the existence of a developed
stock market permits developing investment participations
through public offerings. At present, there are 1,000 publicly held
companies, of which 650 are registered on the stock exchanges."'
Finally, Brazil provides interesting investment opportunities be-
cause of its rapid development, population of 140 million, and its
rank as the eighth largest economy in the world.'32
130. The number of new business initiatives organized during the plano cruzado (from
March 1986 to May 1986, 113,000 new companies were organized) is an indication of this
spirit. See R. Teixeira da Costa, supra note 57.
131. See R. TEIXEIRA DA COSTA, supra note 108, at 14.
132. INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT RE-
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Venture capital companies can provide capital and financial
services for small and medium size enterprises that will contribute
to the creation of a strong domestic economy. Debt-to-equity
swaps by foreign bank creditors offer the financial support neces-
sary to facilitate the access of venture capital to long-term re-
sources in the capital market.
B. Special Risk Taking Funds
Venture capital activity focuses on channeling funds into risky
investments. The establishment of specialized investment vehicles,
capable of assuming and diversifying risks for participating inves-
tors, is an important way of facilitating this channeling of funds. In
recent years, several types of specialized funds have been created
especially for this purpose. 3'
A large number of debt conversion funds have been organized
since February 1988, when Resolution 1460 came into effect.134 The
Central Bank and the CVM have defined basic guidelines to create
swap funds aimed exclusively at buying shares in companies lo-
cated in the needy Northern and Northeastern regions. In such
cases, at least seventy percent of each fund's portfolio must be in-
vested in private sector companies whose shares are publicly
traded.135 The remaining thirty percent can be invested in govern-
ment securities or open market paper. ' In all swap funds, the
value of shares of each portfolio cannot exceed five percent of the
voting capital or twenty percent of total equity in a company.
Swap funds can obtain capital in two ways, namely, foreign credi-
tors may buy shares in the fund by converting their loans at sched-
uled auctions, and fund managers themselves may convert their
own loans into a portfolio of stock held by the swap fund.1 37
Fifteen foreign capital investment funds were in operation in
Brazil during 1988.138 These funds were invested primarily in the
share market, but also allocated funds to other types of securities,
PORT 1989, at 164-65, 168-69 (1989).
133. See infra app., table 3 which compares specialized funds according to number,
sources of funds, and investment objectives.
134. Id.
135. See Monteiro, supra note 78.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 8; see also Funds for Amazon, Northeast, Gazeta Mercantil, Apr. 25, 1988,
at 8.
138. See infra app., table 3.
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including federal government bonds and bank certificates of de-
posit. Three types of vehicles are authorized according to Resolu-
tion 1289.111 One vehicle, the Managed Portfolio of Bonds and Se-
curities (Brazil Fund), was established early in 1988 and
distributed in the United States. The Brazil Fund is subject to the
provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940.140
In 1988, Circular 1339 was issued,' 4' providing for the estab-
lishment of Foreign Investment Companies. In this same year, only
one of these companies existed, namely, Equitypar Companhia de
Participa Ses. Equitypar may only invest in the primary share
market and not in the secondary market, unless it takes a mini-
mum of five percent of the capital of the company, a non-specula-
tive role. Investee companies may use funds for expansion, mod-
ernization or financial restructuring purposes. It is expected that
participations of Equitypar will be more permanent and the port-
folios of Foreign Investment Companies will be less volatile than
Debt Conversion Funds.
Equitypar was organized and is managed by Brasilpar Servi~os
Financeiros Ltda. ("BSF"), a financial services company with ex-
perience in managing industrial and venture capital investment
funds in Brazil. BSF applied to the Central Bank of Brazil in July
1987 for authorization to launch Equitypar. 142 Equitypar is a Bra-
zilian portfolio company whose purpose is to invest in a selected
number of medium and large industrial and commercial compa-
nies, offering investors a suitable return consisting of a steady flow
of dividends and realized capital gains.' 43 In order to provide capi-
tal for Equitypar, a two tranche capital offering was structured.'44
Since the application for Equitypar was made prior to July 20,
1987, investors choosing this debt conversion vehicle will benefit
139. See generally id.
140. See BRAZIL FUND, supra note 64, at 5.
141. BRASILPAR SERVIcos FINANCEIROS LTDA., BANQUE PARIBAS, OFFERING SUMMARY,
EQUITYPAR COMPANHIA DE PARTICIPA OES 1-2 (1987).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See infra app., table 4. The capitalization of Equitypar on July 1988 was: First
Banque Paribas, US$42.0 million; Banque Sudameris, US$10.0 million; First National Bank
of Chicago, US$10.0 million; Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd., US$10.0 million; Banco del Got-
tardo, US$5.0 million; Banque Internationale a Luxembourg, US$3.0 million; and second
tranche Banco Financeiro e Industrial de Investimento S.A., US$2.5 million. It is reported
that the International Finance Corporation may participate in Equitypar as a minority
stockholder. Equitypar in Business, Gazeta Mercantil, July 11, 1988, at 6.
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from the rules of Carta Circular 1125145 issued by the Central Bank
which permits full registration of converted amounts, not dis-
counted values, of foreign capital for purposes of dividends and
capital registration. Investors must agree to maintain their capital
investments in Brazil for a period of twelve years.
Equitypar intends to follow an investment strategy which in-
cludes minority participations in dynamic and well managed com-
panies. The average maturity of investments will be geared to
achieve an annual turnover of approximately twelve percent.'
4
Equitypar aims at financing approximately twenty projects which
will be allocated an average of five million dollars. Not more than
twenty percent to thirty percent of the funds portfolio will be in-
vested in one project and one sector.
Thus far, Brazil has succeeded in stimulating the development
of a growing number and variety of investment funds. All of these
funds operate in the venture capital field. These special investment
vehicles can play an important role in the debt conversion and
privatization programs formalized in 1988.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both debt conversion and privatization offer opportunities to
expand and deepen the Brazilian financial markets. Debt conver-
sion should permit some enterprises to reduce their total debt out-
standing, which will make their remaining securities more attrac-
tive to investors in the capital market. More important, debt
conversions can create liquid capital for investment activity,
thereby increasing the amount of risk capital available to Brazilian
enterprises. Further, conversions can stimulate and finance higher
levels of foreign investment in Brazil. In fact, one study reported
that in the five year period between 1983 to 1987 conversions pro-
vided between thirty-four percent and sixty-one percent of funds
invested in Brazil by foreign investors.1"7 Conversions can also sup-
ply liquid capital to swap funds which seek to make venture capi-
tal investments. In addition, private placement funds attract credi-
tor banks and other foreign investors. Private placements are
created without public offering, but are registered with the CVM.
145. See generally Funds for Amazon, Northeast, supra note 137.
146. Id. at 4.
147. See Monteiro, supra note 78, at 61.
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Privatization can be structured to make extensive use of the
capital market. The auction of controlling interests in an enter-
prise to an investor group mobilizes resources and helps to develop
the capital market. More important, requiring the investor group
to open the capital of the enterprise assures fuller development of
the capital market. A pulverization of capital, distributing shares
widely to employees and public investors, accords maximum op-
portunity for expansion of the stock market.
Overall, privatization and debt conversions can be mutually
supporting activities on the capital market. Debt conversions can
liquify capital for investment in Brazil, especially since the availa-
bility of liquid capital is a requirement for carrying out privatiza-
tion. At the same time privatization stimulates a demand for liquid
capital. Although it is too early to judge how beneficial these pro-
grams will be for future development of the Brazilian capital mar-
ket, the prospects are nevertheless promising.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Portfolios of Capital Market Institutions
(Millions of Cruzados)
Year Private
Pension
Funds
(Closed)
Share
Mutual
Funds
Insurance Fixed
Companies Income
Mutual
Funds
1985 60,090 17,970 9,976 21,056 1,818 325
1986 91,270 31,614 16,705 12,892 2,975 512
Source: Central Bank of Brazil
Table 2: Capital Invested in Mutual Funds, Feb. 12, 1988.
(Millions of Currency Units)
Type of
Fund
Share Funds
Fixed Income
Short Term
Total
Number
of Funds
111,235
155,968
Invested Capital
Cruzados US Dollars*
142,324
203,654
977,608
1,323,586
890
1,270
6,110
8,270
* Obtained by using exchange rate of Cz$160 per U.S. dollar.
Source: Jornal de Brasilia, July 7, 1988, at 6.
Table 3: Main Features of Brazilian Investment Funds - 1988
Type
Fund
Applicable
Legislation
and
Regulation
Number of
Funds
Organized
and
Operating
Source of
Funds and
Amount
Invested
(Millions)
Investment
Objective
Debt Resolution
Conversion 1460
Feb. 1, 1988
Organized 54
Operating 8
Circular
1339
July 26, 1988
Resolution
1289
Debt
Conversion
Debt
Conversion;
Other
Foreign and
Local ($85)
Foreign
Investor
Channel Funds
Released From
Debt
Conversion
Into Venture
Capital
Permanent
Type
Investments
Diversified
Securities
19891 563
Private
Pension
Funds
(Open)
TotalSocieties
for
Foreign
Investment
Foreign
Investment
Companies
Foreign
Capital
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Investment Mar. 20, 1987
Resolution
1289
Mar. 20, 1987;
Investment
Company Act
of 1940'
($512)
1 in U.S. Foreign
Investor
($150)
564
Managed
Portfolio
of Bonds
and
Securities'
(Brazil
Fund)
Tranche Total
Capital
Minimum
Subscription
$5-10
Source of
Funds
External
Debt Conversion
Direct Foreign
Investment
and Domestic
Funds
[Vol. 20:3
Portfolio
Long Term
Appreciation
Through
Investment in
Securities
Portfolio
Table 4: Two Tranche Capital Offering of Equitypar.
1. Information refers to Brazil Fund, launched in March 1988 with shares distributed
to U.S. investors.
2. Brazil Fund was incorporated in Maryland as a non-diversified closed end invest-
ment company, registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
